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Too Close For Comfort: Britain, Ultra, and the Battle of the Atlantic (1941-43) - Page 3

© Joseph Sramek

Until March 1943, Allied strategy mainly focused on maneuvering convoys around the U-Boat peril. Some U-Boats were sunk during the previous two years, but mainly through depth changes and radar, not Ultra. In March 1943, this strategy changed. Many began to believe that it was becoming impossible to maneuver convoys around the U-Boats, as more and more U-Boats were being deployed there. Many agreed with Admiral Pound when he said that "the Atlantic is now becoming so saturated by U-Boats that the practice of evasion is rapidly becoming impossible." [20] The consensus became that the Allies had ".... to fight the convoys through them." [21] This became the new Allied strategy, which was crucial in leading to the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic two months later.

Ultra contributed to the new battle strategy. Through Ultra, the Allies knew what convoys were in danger. As a result, they were able to plan accordingly, by organizing "special task forces of escorts" to escort the convoys. [22] All of these changes led to only 327,943 tons sunk during the month of April, a reduction of 48 percent from March. [23]

By the Spring of 1943, "Ultra enabled the Admiralty to play hide-and-seek in the Atlantic with its eyes open." [24] In May, the Allies sank 47 U-Boats, more than in any more month. [25] These losses proved too much of a burden. On May 24, Dönitz conceded defeat by ordering all of the remaining U-Boats to leave the North Atlantic. [26]

The Battle of the Atlantic was one of the more closely-fought campaigns of the Second World War. In retrospect, it is amazing how close the Germans came to completely thwarting the Allied convoys. The campaign was the only one in which the British did not have an advantage in intelligence. In fact, during much of the battle, the British intelligence efforts were inferior to those of the Germans. Only in the end did the Allies prevail.

During the months of June, July, and August, 96 convoys containing 3,757 ships sailed between the United States and England. Of these, only three were sunk, an infinitesimal percentage. [27] With the ability to ship massive amounts of supplies now assured, the Allies built up supplies and forces for D-Day. Ultra played its greatest role in the planning and execution that followed.

Next Week: The Greatest Deception of All Time: Britain, Ultra, and the Preparations for D-Day

Footnotes:

[1] Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes To War, (NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), p. 211.

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