By the New Year, the English had driven Rommel's Army out of Egypt and toward Tripoli. The Americans were safely ensconced in Morocco and Algeria. In most respects, the war in North Africa was coming to a quick end. This is aptly shown by a 90 percent drop in cargo disembarked between November and December. [19] With this figure, it seems obvious that four months later, the Axis lost all of North Africa.
North Africa demonstrated Ultra's increasing effectiveness. The information that Ultra provided was instrumental in the near British success at Crete, and the British successes in Crusader and later in El Alamein. Thus it is often asked why it was that the North African campaign lasted more than two years, if the British had such an excellent source of information.
When contemplating this, one should consider that the best information in the world is useless, if adequate means are not available. Crete and the lack of British success anti-convoy operations during the first six months of 1942 are perfect examples. In many ways, without Ultra, it can be easily concluded that Rommel would have been successful in North Africa, and it was only due to Ultra that the Allies, over time, were able to defeat him.
Footnotes:
[1] Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2nd ed., pp. 218-19.
[2] Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes To War, (NY: Mc-Graw Hill Book Co., 1978), p. 157.
[3] Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Meditteranean Strategy, (NY: William Morrow, 1989), p. 54.
[4] F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence During the Second World War, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office [HMSO], 1979), p. 420.
[5] Bennett, p. 51.
[6] Weinberg, p. 229.
[7] Bennett, p. 71.
[8] Ibid., p. 79.
[9] Weinberg, p. 232.
[10] Hinsley, v. 2., (London: HMSO, 1981), p. 325.
[11] Weinberg, p. 348.
[12] Ibid., p. 349.
[13] Lewin, p. 266.
[14] Hinsley, v. 2., p. 422.
[15] Ibid., quoting David Richards, The RAF, 1939-45, v. 2., p. 231.
[16] Bennett, p. 160.
