By the end of the month, the Germans had recovered almost all the ground they had lost in Crusader. This happened for a variety of reasons. Of primary importance was British lack of success in anti-convoy efforts. During the months of February and March, the British were only able to sink nine percent of the convoys, a figure which declined even further in April to less than one percent. [12] As a result, in May 1942, Rommel was able to preempt a planned Allied offensive with one of his.
Although Ultra revealed Rommel's intentions a few days before the offensive, the British were slow to act upon the information. When Rommel struck on May 27, he achieved rapid success. A month later, Rommel pushed the British entirely out of Libya, conquered Tobruk, and continued on the offensive into Egypt. His offensive continued deep into Egypt, until he was suddenly stopped in July 1942 at El Alamein.
This was due largely to increased British success in sinking Axis convoys during the second half of 1942. The lack of sufficient supplies, mainly oil, restricted Rommel's maneuvers in Alamein. [13] During the second half of 1942, the percentage of Axis shipping sunk was at least 20% for five of the six months. [14] At the end of September, Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Secretary, was quoted as saying that "at this rate the African problem will automatically end since we shall have no more ships with which to supply Libya." [15] In October, the month of the second battle of El Alamein, the percentage rose to a staggering 44 percent. No question, this success was in large part responsible for the tremendous Allied victory that followed.
On October 24, Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery launched the Second Battle of El Alamein. The role the Ultra plaed was considerable. Through Ultra, Montgomery knew that the Axis forces had almost completely consumed their oil supplies. [16] Armed with this information, Montgomery hammered hard at Rommel's forces, with the knowledge that Rommel was inhibited from launching major counter-attacks.
