The fighting during these two years was comparable to a swinging pendulum. At times, it looked as though the Axis powers were about to rout the British. At other times, successful English counterattacks drove the Axis back to where they had started. In the end, victory was achieved by the Allies, in large part due to Ultra.
Before Ultra played a significant role in North Africa, though, it played one elsewhere in the Mediteranean. As a prelude to Operation Barbarossa, the Germans invaded the Balkans in the Spring of 1941. When they invaded Greece, Churchill transferred troops from North Africa. In the end, though, this made little difference. [1] As the British retreated toward Crete, the situation looked hopeless. Then, Ultra yielded priceless information.
On April 25, Hitler sent out orders for Operation Mercury, the airborne invasion of Crete. These orders were promptly deciphered by Bletchey Park. [2] While this was helpful, more significant information did not come until two weeks later, when a signal was intercepted detailing Germany's entire battle strategy. [3] Throughout the battle, the British commander, General Bernard Freyberg, knew, through Ultra, German situation reports, reinforcement rates, and the identification of units landed on Crete. [4] Thus, over the course of the ten days that followed, the Germans suffered twice as many casualties as the British. [5] Yet in the end, the British were forced to evacuate the island. Ultra was almost enough to defeat the Germans, and had there been more British troops (or weapons), perhaps this would have happened. Crete proved to be a perfect example of the futility of having intelligence without adequate means to employ it.
Yet all was not for naught. Had the Germans been more successful in Crete, Malta surely would have been their next target. [6] Since the German invasion of Crete had cost the lives of many paratroopers, no more airborne operations were attempted by the Germans for the remainder of the war. As a result, the British retained their hold on Malta, from which they were able to sink a significant amount of Axis convoys. Between May and October 1941, the British sank an average of 180,000 tons (16%) of Axis shipping per month. [7] This percentage, although not appearing to be significant, was enough to cause Allied victory in Crusader. It deprived Rommel of the initiative. [8] He was not able to stockpile weapons, fuel, and explosives, all things that were necessary for a successful offensive. He had to postpone his planned offensive on Tobruk (a military target that he had failed to capture in his Spring 1941 offensive). As a result, Field-Marshal Claude Auchinleck was able to strike first with Crusader in November 1941. [9] Over the course of the following two months, the Germans were pushed back to the same position they had been when Rommel had arrived.
