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Prelude to Gettysburg: The Armies Move North

© Michael J. Swogger

The two commanding generals soon to face one another were similar in demeanor, much different in style. The 47 year-old former commander of the Union V Corps was reliable, deliberate, short-tempered, and well-experienced in direct combat. He had fought on the Peninsula (where he was wounded), Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Though not thought of as the most brilliant of commanders, Major General George Gordon Meade had established a strong reputation as a hard fighter and a soldier highly dedicated to the Union cause. Replacing Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac on June 27, 1863, his resolve and military skill would surely be tested by his formidable adversary.

His foe had been the Army of Northern Virginia's commander since the Spring 1862. He quickly established his reputation for being a strategic genius during the Seven Days battles. He and his men racked up victory after victory in the face of an enemy superior in numbers and munitions. He embarrassed Union generals without discrimination -- McClellan, Pope, McClellan again, Burnside, Hooker. General Robert E. Lee, believed by many to be the best commander on either side, once attempted to invade the North in the Fall 1862 but was forced to withdraw after the bloodiest day of the war at Antietam Creek. But he had since mounted stunning and impressive victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville in the Winter 1862 and Spring 1863, respectively. The time had again arrived to invade the enemy's homeland.

Lee returned from Richmond to the Army of Northern Virginia in late May 1863 after laying out his invasion plans for Secretary of War James Seddon and President Jefferson Davis. Several elements prompted two separate meetings between the three men. The first was Lee's ideas for a northern invasion. The second was Grant's continued pressing of Vicksburg and what, if anything, Lee could do to alleviate the pressure on General Pemberton in Mississippi. Though Davis himself, upon hearing the precarious position in which Grant had placed Pemberton, thought that elements of Lee's force should be dispatched to Pemberton's aid. However, he would soon acquiesce and endorse Lee's strategy, if for no other reason that to perhaps compel Grant to abandon his Vicksburg assault to help rid Pennsylvania of Lee (Coddington, 1968).

That is, of course, provided Lee would be successful in implementing his strategy. His objectives were formed early in May and remained quite clear in his eyes through his late May meeting with Davis. First, he wanted to eradicate a Federal threat in Virginia. The war in the eastern theater had primarily been fought in Virginia and the carnage had taken its toll on the land. The farmers and townspeople indeed needed the kind of relief an northern invasion would provide. Second, an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would re-employ an offensive strategy that Stonewall Jackson had always favored. Included in the objectives of an invasion were the cities of Harrisburg and Philadelphia. In Lee's mind, the capture of one or both of these important Pennsylvanian cities would force Lincoln to finally recognize the legitimacy of the Confederate effort and broach a peace settlement (Hassler, 1970).