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Mercenaries, the Comoros Islands, and a Critique of the Modern U.S. Military

© Jessica Powers

Imagine two first-graders, a boy and a girl, sitting on the balance beam in the school playground, swinging their legs and talking while they eat their peanut-butter and jelly sandwiches together the first day of school.

"What does your daddy do?" the girl asks the little boy.

"Oh, my daddy is a lawyer. He puts bad people in jail. What does your daddy do?"

"My daddy is a professional killer," says the little girl, taking a big swig of milk. "He's in Iraq right now. We don't see him a lot. But he got to meet the President!"

"Cool," says the little boy. "I wish MY daddy was a mercenary!"

These days, mercenaries don't get the kind of respect they used to, despite the fact that the soldier of today resembles the mercenary of long ago. It was during the Renaissance that the idea that people should serve in their country's militaries out of patriotism took root. Up to then, kingdoms rose and fell to the trumpet of mercenaries. Other than conscription, it was a common way to get people to fight wars - pay 'em enough money when they've won a battle to make it worth their while, but make sure you don't pay 'em until they're done fighting to ensure they do a good job.

The dictionary gives two definitions of "mercenary." As an adjective, it describes an individual "working or acting merely for money or other reward; venal." As a noun, the word means "a professional soldier serving in a foreign army."

Mercenaries have wreaked havoc in Africa in the 20th century, sometimes at the behest of western powers, sometimes of their own accord. One of the mercenaries who staged several coups in Africa, the Frenchman Bob Denard, claimed his every action was blessed by the French military. If we take his words at face value, he was patriotic, even though he may have acted partly out of "mercenary" concerns. Indeed, when he faced trial in France many years later for one of his military exploits, two French generals, a French ambassador, and De Gaulle's closest adviser all backed Denard up when he said he was merely serving his country (Weinberg 245-247). This in itself is a reminder that the powers-that-be are not above using whatever means at their disposal to reach their desired ends in any particular country. It is also evidence that patriotism and greed are not mutually exclusive motivations.

Denard staged two - probably three - coups in the Comoros. First, he overthrew Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane, who had ascended to power in the Comoros, and gave power to a man called Ali Soilih, who subsequently failed to fulfill the promise of riches and power to Denard's satisfaction. To add insult to injury, he kicked Denard off the island. So, three years later, when Abdallah decided to stage a coup to get rid of Soilih in May 1978, Denard gladly switched allegiance and toppled the same man he had installed in January 1976. Sixteen days after the coup that ended his regime, the mercenaries murdered Soilih. Abdallah remained in power until 1989, when he was mysteriously murdered under circumstances that looked suspiciously as though Denard had played a role in his death, although the evidence has never been proven to be anything but circumstantial.